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1. Introduction
Economic markets with indivisible goods have been considered using
worthy matching models. In this setting there are different but related
models. In a two-sided matching game or assignment game there are essen-
tial coalitions formed from two different types of agents and these essential
coalitions are the singletons and doubletons containing one agent of each
type. The bilateral assignment game comes initially from Shapley (1955),
but Shapley and Shubik (1971) is the paper most cited. In it the authors
introduce and analyze a housing market as a bilateral assignment market.
We refer now to another seminal paper, Becker (1973). In it, pursuing a
general theory of marriage, Becker introduces a special class of assignment
games, the two-sided assortative ones. In some assignment problems Becker
displays the well-known effect of mating of the likes. Finally, Crawford and
Knoer (1981) develops a model of labor market by using matching and as-
signment tools. This last model easily allows to motivate the relevance to
study m-sided matching games, with m ≥ 3. It is easy to think of situations
where m types of different skills’ workers are needed to achieve valuable
essential coalitions. Precisely the main purpose of this paper is to analyze
m-sided assortative games.
In all these previous models the most relevant set solution is the core.
Roughly speaking the core is formed by all those allocations in which no
coalition of agents can improve its reward on its own. Although the core
of two-sided assignment games has been extensively studied, and important
properties are known: non-emptiness, its lattice structure, the side-optimal
core allocations, etc., the core of m-sided assignment games, m ≥ 3, has
not got the same attention. There are only a few papers on it. Many
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difficulties arise when moving from two-sided to m-sided problems. Most
of the results fall in the negative which in our opinion does not mean the
subject is unimportant.
In this paper we develop positive results. Firstly we analyze a simple
mechanism to describe the whole core of any assortative m-sided assignment
game. Our method characterizes for the first time all the extreme core al-
locations of any assortative m-sided matching game. The procedure can be
applied for the two-sided case as well as the generic m-sided case. The mech-
anism depends only on the assignment array data, with no need to compute
the characteristic function of the game. We give also the maximum number
of extreme core allocations, m · (m!)n−1, where m is the number of sectors
and n is the number of agents in each sector. As a by-product we obtain the
number of extreme core allocations when we deal only with two sectors, 2n.
Finally our mechanism is an extension of the one recently published for the
two-sided assortative assignment games (Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz et al., 2019).
It is simplified in some features and proofs are completely different. The
two-sided assortative case was also analyzed in Eriksson et al. (2000) where
they show that the core is ordered in payoffs inside each sector. We prove
that this property remains true for the general m-sided case.
Multisided assignment games were analyzed for the first time in Quint
(1991). After showing a three-sided example with an empty core, Quint
presents a class of games with the property that the core is non-empty,
i.e. balanced. Stuart (1997) proposes another balanced class of multisided
assignment games, not related to Quint’s class (none of them includes the
other). A proof of the non-emptiness is provided, but no description or
characterization of the core is given in any of the two models.
Sherstyuk (1999) introduces another important class of m-sided match-
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ing games. She analyzes for the first time the assortative multisided assign-
ment games. The definition of this class relies on two conditions imposed on
the assignment array: supermodularity and monotonicity. Both conditions
assume that agents in each sector can be ranked by some trait or ability. Su-
permodularity is a complementary property of agents’ ability across types.
Monotonicity means that ability is aligned with the worth generated by the
essential coalitions.
Assortative multisided assignment games form a large class of m-sided
assignment games: a full-dimensional cone. In Sherstyuk’s paper it is proved
the non-emptiness of the core and she describes some extreme core alloca-
tions, m! of them, by using the associated characteristic function.
2. Preliminaries on the multisided assignment markets
A multisided assignment market (N1, N2, . . . , Nm;A) is formed by m
non-empty pairwise disjoint finite sets of agents, Nk =
{
1k, 2k, . . . , nkk
}
1
for k ∈ M = {1, . . . ,m} and a non-negative m-dimensional array A =
(aE)E∈Πmk=1Nk . Each entry aE represents some measure of the joint produc-
tivity of agents in E = (i1, i2, . . . , im) ∈ Πmk=1Nk, one of each set when they
are matched together. We assume that we need exactly one agent of each
type to realize the value of a transaction. Each set Nk is called a sector
and corresponds to a different type of agents, having different skills. Any
m-tuple of agents E = (i1, . . . , im) ∈ Πmk=1Nk is called an essential coalition
and we use E either as the m-tuple or as the set of elements formed by its
components. In the case of two sectors, m = 2, matrix A is known as the
1To simplify notation, when no confusion arises, we will drop the superscript to describe
the agents in Nk, i.e. Nk = {1, 2, ..., nk} . Its cardinality is |Nk| = nk.
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assignment matrix (Shapley and Shubik, 1972). When the number of agents
is the same in each sector |N1| = |N2| = . . . = |Nm| the assignment market
is said to be square.
A matching µ among N1, . . . , Nm is a set of essential coalitions such that
any agent belongs at most to one coalition in µ, and |µ| = mink∈M |Nk|. An
agent who does not belong to any of the essential coalitions of µ is unmatched
by µ. The set of all matchings is denoted byM (N1, . . . , Nm) . A matching
µ is optimal if it maximizes
∑
E∈µ aE over the set M
(
N1, . . . , Nm
)
. The
set of all optimal matchings is denoted by M∗A
(
N1, . . . , Nm
)
.
Shapley and Shubik (1971) associates any bilateral assignment market
with a cooperative game2, the assignment game. In the multisided assign-
ment game (Quint, 1991), the set of players is N =
⋃m
k=1N
k and the char-
acteristic function wA is defined for any S ⊆ N such that S ∩ Nk 6= ∅ for
all k ∈M, by
wA (S) = max
µ∈M(S∩N1,...,S∩Nm)
∑
E∈µ
aE , and 0 otherwise.
Notice that any essential coalition evaluates its worth by exactly the cor-
responding entry, and any other coalition determines its worth by essential
coalition combinations its members can form.
The agents of a multisided assignment market may divide among them-
selves their worth, wA(N), in any way they like. Thus an allocation is a
non-negative vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ Πmk=1Rnk+ . Vector xk ∈ Rnk+ is
interpreted as the payoffs to agents in Nk, i.e. xki is the payoff associated to
2In a cooperative game (N, v), the set of players is given by N = {1, . . . , n} and v is a
function that assigns a real number v(S) for any coalition S ⊆ N with v(∅) = 0. Its core
is defined as C(v) := {x ∈ Rn | ∑i∈N xi = v(N) and for all S ⊆ N, ∑i∈S xi ≥ v(S)}. A
game is named balanced if its core is non-empty.
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player i of sector k. For any essential coalition E = (i1, . . . , im) ∈ Πmk=1Nk
we write x(E) =
∑m
k=1 x
k
ik
.
The core of the multisided assignment game C (wA) is described for any
fixed optimal matching µ ∈ M∗A
(
N1, . . . , Nm
)
as those allocations x ∈
Πmk=1R
nk
+ satisfying
x(E) = aE for all E ∈ µ,
x(E) ≥ aE for all E /∈ µ,
and unassigned agents by µ receive a zero payoff in any core allocation.
In the two-sided case, Shapley and Shubik (1971) proves that the core
of any assignment game is always non-empty, but in the multisided case,
m ≥ 3, it is known (Kaneko and Wooders, 1982, or Quint, 1991) that the
core may be empty.
Becker (1973) introduces two-sided assortative assignment markets. For
multisided assignment markets, we assume that the elements of each sector
are ordered by some trait and then Nk for k ∈M is an ordered set with the
natural order. Therefore Πmk=1N
k is a lattice and for any pair of essential
coalitions E,E′ ∈ Πmk=1Nk we can define E∨E′ as the maximum component-
wise and E ∧ E′ as the minimum component-wise.
A multisided assignment market (N1, N2, . . . , Nm;A) is an assortative
market if it satisfies:
a) supermodularity:3
aE + aE′ ≤ aE∨E′ + aE∧E′ for all E,E′ ∈ Πmk=1Nk. (1)
3Notice that this condition implies that array entries form a supermodular function in
the lattice N1 ×N2 × . . .×Nm with the usual order (see Topkis, 1998).
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b) monotonicity (non-decreasing rows, columns, etc.):
aE ≤ aE′ for all E ≤ E′, E,E′ ∈ Πmk=1Nk. (2)
Whenever these two conditions are met, array A is called assortative.
From the supermodularity condition, in a multisided assortative assign-
ment market at least one optimal matching µ ∈M∗A
(
N1, . . . , Nm
)
is mono-
tone,4 i.e.
for any E,E′ ∈ µ, either E ≤ E′ or E′ ≤ E.
When the assortative assignment market is square, |N1| = |N2| = . . . =
|Nm| = n there is only one monotone matching which is placed in the main
diagonal. If we denote the following essential coalitions: Ei = (i, i, . . . , i),
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, this monotone matching is µ = {E1, E2, . . . , En} . This
is, by the previous observation, optimal in the square supermodular case,
maybe not unique.
From now on, we concentrate in the square case, since any non-square
assortative array could be analyzed by adding null rows of entries at the
beginning of the array, to make it square. In this way we preserve super-
modularity and the monotonicity conditions.
We give some new features of any square multisided assortative assign-
ment market. To this end, the central strip in a square multisided assignment
market are those essential coalitions
E = (i1, i2, . . . , im) such that max
k∈M
ik − min
k∈M
ik ≤ 1.
4Notice that if there are two essential coalitions E,E′ of µ that are not comparable ,
we can use supermodularity to obtain a new optimal matching with E ∨ E′ and E ∧ E′.
Sherstyuk (1999) calls such a matching consecutive.
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or equivalently those essential coalitions such that
Ei−1 ≤ E ≤ Ei for i = 2, . . . , n. (3)
Theorem 2.1. For any square multisided assortative assignment market
(N1, N2, . . . , Nm;A) we have:
(a) The main diagonal of the assignment array A is an optimal matching
(maybe not unique).
(b) An allocation x ∈ Πmk=1Rnk+ belongs to the core C(wA) if and only if 5
(b1) x(E) = aE for all E = E1, E2, . . . , En, (4)
(b2) x(E) ≥ aE for all E ∈ Πmk=1Nk such that
Ei−1 < E < Ei for i = 2, . . . , n. (5)
(c) At any core allocation x ∈ C(wA) we have for all k ∈M
0 ≤ xk1 ≤ xk2 ≤ . . . ≤ xkn.
Proof. Item (a) follows by our previous comments. To prove (b) assume that
x ∈ Πmk=1Rnk+ satisfies (4) and (5). We prove that x(E) ≥ aE for all essential
coalitions E = (i1, i2, . . . , im) by induction on r = maxk∈M ik −mink∈M ik.
Assume the induction hypothesis: If E is such that maxk∈M ik−mink∈M ik ≤
r then x(E) ≥ aE . Notice that for r = 1 the inequalities are just (4) and (5).
Let E = (i1, i2, . . . , im) such that maxk∈M ik −mink∈M ik = r ≥ 2. Denote
j = 1 + mink∈M ik. Then, by supermodularity, aE + aEj ≤ aE∧Ej + aE∨Ej .
Clearly E ∧ Ej belongs to the central strip, E ∨ Ej satisfies the induction
hypothesis, and x(Ej) = aEj . Therefore, aE ≤ x(E ∧ Ej) + x(E ∨ Ej) −
5We denote E < E′ for E ≤ E′ and E 6= E′.
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x(Ej) = x(E). To see (c), assume for instance x ∈ C(wA). Then for i =
1, . . . , n − 1 we have x(Ei) = aEi , and take the essential coalition E′ given
by (i+1, i, . . . , i). Then we have
∑m
k=1 x
k
i = aEi , and x
1
i+1 +
∑m
k=2 x
k
i ≥ aE′ .
Thus, 0 ≤ aE′ − aEi ≤ x1i+1 − x1i .
Notice that item (b) means that only the central strip of array A is
necessary to determine the core conditions. Item (c) means that in any
square assortative market, payoffs in the core are such that for any sector,
agents are ranked in the same way.
Remark 2.1. Looking at the proof of Theorem 2.1, notice that the proof of
items (a) and (b) only uses the supermodularity condition (1) of the assign-
ment array.
Item (c) is implied by the monotonicity condition (2) and the fact that
we have an optimal matching in the main diagonal. It could be interesting to
know which conditions on the array A characterize the results of the above
theorem.
A different proof of item (b) in the supermodular two-sided case can be
found in Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz and Rafels (2014). The fact that payoffs to
agents in the core are ordered is known for two-sided assortative matrices
(see Eriksson et al., 2000).
3. Extreme core allocations
Now we give a simple procedure to obtain all the extreme core points. To
this end, for notational convenience we introduce, for any square assortative
multisided assignment market, an auxiliary agent 0 for any sector. We
denote E0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0) with aE0 = 0 and also for any E such that E0 <
E < E1 we denote aE = 0.
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A path p is a sequence of essential coalitions connecting the initial one E0
with the last one En passing through all essential coalitions E0, E1, . . . En
where Ei = (i, i, . . . , i) for i = 0, 1, . . . , n. Moreover, between Ei−1 and
Ei, i = 1, . . . , n, the essential coalitions are such that from one essential
coalition to the next one we change the agent of only one sector, moving
from agent i− 1 to agent i. Then path p is
p =
(
E0, . . . , E1, . . . , Ei−1, E1i , E
2
i , . . . , E
m−1
i , Ei, . . . , En
)
,
where Ei−1 < E1i < E2i < . . . < E
m−1
i < Ei, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. As a
consequence, these paths are included in the central strip, see (3). Given a
path p, notice that each block Ei−1 < E1i < E2i < . . . < E
m−1
i < Ei, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n can also be described by a particular permutation θi ∈ Θ(M)
indicating the order of the sectors that are sequentially increased. The set
of all paths is denoted by Pmn .
For each path p ∈ Pmn we associate an allocation vector, which we name
the p-vector, xp ∈ Πmk=1Rnk+ by solving the linear equations given by all the
places of the selected path
xp(E) = aE for E belonging to p, (6)
where we use (xp)k0 = 0, for k = 1, . . . ,m, that is any auxiliary agent 0 gets
a null payoff.
For each path p the above linear system has a unique non-negative solu-
tion. We prove uniqueness and non-negativeness by induction over n. Firstly
notice that if n = 1 there are m! different paths between E0 and E1, but
vector xp is aE1ek for some k ∈ M where ek is the canonical vector. As-
sume that the solution is unique and non-negative up to Ei−1, and without
loss of generality assume that the next essential coalition E1i of path p is
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(i, i− 1, . . . , i− 1). Then by (6) we have
m∑
k=1
xki−1 = aEi−1 , and
x1i +
m∑
k=2
xki−1 = aE1i ,
where we have dropped the superscript p for the path. Then, using the
monotonicity (2) and the induction hypothesis we obtain
x1i = x
1
i−1 + (aE1i − aEi−1) ≥ x
1
i−1 ≥ 0.
Therefore for each path p ∈ Pmn we have a unique and non-negative p-vector.
Now let us write Ext(C(wA)) the set of all extreme core points.6 We
prove next that any extreme core point is linked to a path, that is, there
is a correspondence between paths and extreme core points. This is our
following theorem, but we need some lemmas and notation.
Lemma 3.1. Let (N1, N2, . . . , Nm;A) be a square multisided assortative
assignment market. For any extreme core point x ∈ C(wA) we have xk∗1 =
aE1 for some k
∗ ∈M and xk1 = 0 for all k ∈M \ {k∗}.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that there are two sectors, k′, k′′ ∈M such
that xk
′
1 > 0 and x
k′′
1 > 0 and define ε = min{xk
′
1 , x
k′′
1 } > 0. Now define
y, z ∈ Πmk=1Rnk+ as follows, for t = 1, . . . , n,
ykt =

xkt , for k ∈M \ {k′, k′′},
xk
′
t + ε, for k = k
′,
xk
′′
t − ε, for k = k′′,
zkt =

xkt , for k ∈M \ {k′, k′′},
xk
′
t − ε, for k = k′,
xk
′′
t + ε, for k = k
′′.
6If X ⊆ Rn is a convex set, an element of this convex set x ∈ X is an extreme point if
x = 1
2
y + 1
2
z for some y, z ∈ X, then x = y = z.
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Clearly by Theorem 2.1(c) and the definition of ε these are non-negative
vectors, and since y(E) = x(E) and z(E) = x(E) for all essential coalitions
E, we have y, z ∈ C(wA). As a consequence x = 12y + 12z with y 6= x
and z 6= x, getting a contradiction with the fact that x is an extreme core
point.
Now we introduce for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} the submarket given by all
the first i agents from any sector, and the corresponding restricted array.
Formally, that is (N1i , N
2
i , . . . , N
m
i ;A
i) where Nki = {1, . . . , i} for all k ∈M
and Ai is given by Ai = (aE)E∈Πmk=1Nki . Each of these markets is assortative
and an optimal matching is given by the main diagonal when the original
market is assortative and square.
Next we relate the extreme core points of these markets with our original
square multisided assortative assignment market. To this end, for each x ∈
C(wA) we denote by x¯
i the restriction of vector x to the coordinates of
Πmk=1N
k
i , i.e.
x¯i = (x11, . . . , x
1
i , x
2
1, . . . , x
2
i , . . . , x
m
1 , . . . , x
m
i ) ∈ Πmk=1RN
k
i
+ . (7)
Clearly x¯i ∈ C(wAi) for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} if x ∈ C(wA).
In our next lemma we prove that whenever we take an extreme core point
we obtain an extreme core point, given by the restriction, for all submarkets
previously defined.
Lemma 3.2. Let (N1, N2, . . . , Nm;A) be a square multisided assortative
assignment market, and x ∈ C(wA) be an extreme core point. Then, x¯i ∈
C(wAi) is an extreme core point for i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} is the first index
such that x¯i
∗
is not an extreme point of C(wAi∗ ). By Lemma 3.1, i
∗ > 1.
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Since we are assuming x¯i
∗ ∈ C(wAi∗ ) but not an extreme core point,
there are two points y∗, z∗ ∈ C(wAi∗ ) such that
x¯i
∗
=
1
2
y∗ +
1
2
z∗ with y∗ 6= x¯i∗ and z∗ 6= x¯i∗ . (8)
Notice that for all i < i∗ we have yki = z
k
i = x
k
i for all k ∈ M, because the
corresponding restriction x¯i
∗−1 gives an extreme core point.
Now define the following vectors y, z ∈ Πmk=1Rnk as follows: for all k ∈M,
yki =
xki , for i = 1, . . . , i∗ − 1,xki + εk, for i = i∗, . . . , n, zki =
xki , for i = 1, . . . , i∗ − 1,xki − εk, for i = i∗, . . . , n.
where εk = (y∗)ki∗ − xki∗ for all k ∈ M. Notice that because of (8), at least
one εk must be different from zero, and we have (z∗)ki∗ − xki∗ = −εk for all
k ∈M. Moreover∑
k∈M
εk =
∑
k∈M
(y∗)ki∗ − xki∗ = y∗(Ei∗)− x(Ei∗) = aEi∗ − aEi∗ = 0. (9)
We claim y, z ∈ C(wA) and x = 12y + 12z with y 6= x and z 6= x.
Firstly we show y ≥ 0 and z ≥ 0. Clearly yki ≥ 0 and zki ≥ 0 for
i = 1, . . . , i∗ − 1, and all k ∈ M. Moreover, for all k ∈ M we have ykn ≥
ykn−1 ≥ . . . ≥ yki∗ and zkn ≥ zkn−1 ≥ . . . ≥ zki∗ , and to conclude notice that
yki∗ = x
k
i∗ + ε
k = (y∗)ki∗ ≥ 0 and also zki∗ ≥ 0.
Secondly, y(Ei) = aEi , z(Ei) = aEi for i = 1, . . . , n, by their definitions.
Finally, we show that y(E) ≥ aE and z(E) ≥ aE for all essential coali-
tions E in the central strip. For all essential coalitions in the central strip
such that Ei∗ ≤ E, by (9) y(E) = x(E) +
∑
k∈M ε
k = x(E) ≥ aE and
analogously z(E) ≥ aE . By its definition y(E) = z(E) = x(E) ≥ aE for all
essential coalitions E, in the central strip such that E ≤ Ei∗−1. For the case
Ei∗−1 < E < Ei∗ , we claim that y(E) = y∗(E) and z(E) = z∗(E), since we
have that yki∗ = (y
∗)ki∗ and z
k
i∗ = (z
∗)ki∗ for all k ∈M.
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By Theorem 2.1(b) we have y, z ∈ C(wA) and x = 12y + 12z with y 6= x
and z 6= x, contradicting x is an extreme core point.
These two lemmas allow to establish our main theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Let (N1, N2, . . . , Nm;A) be a square multisided assortative
assignment market. In it, p-vectors coincide with extreme core points, i.e.
Ext(C(wA)) = {xp}p∈Pmn .
Proof. We prove first that for all path p ∈ Pmn we have xp ∈ C(wA). To this
end we prove xp(E) ≥ aE for all Ei−1 < E < Ei for all i = 1, . . . , n. By
Theorem 2.1(b) this is enough to justify xp ∈ C(wA).
Without loss of generality we assume that the essential coalitions of path
p between Ei−1 and Ei, i = 1, . . . n, are given by
Ei−1, (i, i− 1, . . . , i− 1), (i, i, i− 1, . . . , i− 1), . . . , Ei, (10)
that is, they follow the natural order of sectors, first moves the first sector,
second the second sector and so forth. We denote by Eti = (i, . . . , i,
t
^
i , i −
1, i− 1, . . . , i− 1), 1 ≤ t ≤ m− 1, the essential coalition in the previous path
such that t is the position of the last i agent, i = 1, . . . , n. As a matter of
notation, E0i = Ei−1 and E
m
i = Ei.
Given any essential coalition E = (i1, i2, . . . , im) with Ei−1 < E <
Ei, i = 1, . . . , n, we define r(E) = #{k | ik = i}, the number of i agents in
the essential coalition E. Now, we prove xp(E) ≥ aE with Ei−1 < E < Ei
by induction on the number r(E). Clearly 1 ≤ r(E) ≤ m − 1. If r(E) = 1
let l be the position of the only i. If l = 1 there is nothing to prove, and
if l > 1 notice that E ∧ El−1i = Ei−1 and E ∨ El−1i = Eli. Therefore, by
supermodularity and the way essential coalitions of path p have been chosen,
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aE + aEl−1i
≤ aEi−1 + aEli , and then aE + x
p(El−1i ) ≤ xp(Ei−1) + xp(Eli).
Now clearly xp(E) ≥ aE . Assume our induction hypothesis is true up to
r−1 and let E be such that r(E) = r. There are then r positions with agent
i and let l be the last of these positions. Then aE + aEl−1i
≤ aE∧El−1i + aEli ,
by supermodularity. We can apply the induction hypothesis to E ∧ El−1i
since it has r(E ∧ El−1i ) = r − 1 positions with an i. Now aE + x(El−1i ) ≤
aE∧El−1i + aEli ≤ x(E ∧ E
l−1
i ) + x(E
l
i), and therefore aE ≤ x(E) to finish
with this part of the proof.
Moreover, vector xp for p ∈ Pmn is an extreme core point. To see it,
just notice that if it were the midpoint of two other core points, these core
points must satisfy with equality all the entries of path p. By uniqueness
of the solution, they coincide with xp. We have established that each path
gives an extreme core point.
Now we prove that any extreme core point is associated to some path.
Let x ∈ C(wA) be an extreme core point. Then by Lemma 3.2, x¯i is also an
extreme core point of C(wAi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, see (7) for notations.
Suppose on the contrary that x is not a p-vector for any path p ∈ Pmn ,
and let i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , n} be the first index such that x¯i∗ is not a p-vector for
any p ∈ Pmi∗ . Notice that |N1i∗ | = |N2i∗ | = . . . = |Nmi∗ | = i∗.
Clearly, by Lemma 3.1, i∗ > 1 since any path between E0 and E1 gives
aE1 to some agent and zero to the others. Vector x¯
i∗−1 is a p-vector for
some path pi∗−1 ∈ Pmi∗−1 and consider the set of paths in Pmi∗ that coincide
with pi∗−1 for all essential coalitions in the central strip E ≤ Ei∗−1. Denote
this set by Bi∗ .
Consider now the set given by convex hull of the p-vectors corresponding
to paths in Bi∗ , that is Conv{xp}p∈Bi∗ . This is a non-empty, compact and
convex set and clearly vector x¯i
∗
cannot be a convex combination of these
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core points {xp}p∈Bi∗ . Then we can apply the separating hyperplane theorem
(see Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004) to this point and set. Therefore there
exists vector
r = (r11, r
1
2, . . . , r
1
i∗ , r
2
1, r
2
2, . . . , r
2
i∗ , . . . , r
m
1 , r
m
2 , . . . , r
m
i∗ ) ∈ Πmk=1Rn
k
i∗
such that
r · x¯i∗ < r · xp for all p ∈ Bi∗ . (11)
Let θ ∈ Θ(M) be an ordering of sectors M such that rθ(1)i∗ ≥ rθ(2)i∗ ≥ . . . ≥
r
θ(m)
i∗ , and define the following sequence of sets: S0 = ∅, S1 = {θ(1)}, S2 =
{θ(1), θ(2)}, . . . , Sm = M.
For each S ⊆M we associate the corresponding essential coalition
ES = (i1, i2, . . . , im) with ik = i
∗ if k ∈ S and ik = i∗ − 1 if k /∈ S.
Notice that ES0 = Ei∗−1 = (i∗ − 1, i∗ − 1, . . . , i∗ − 1) and ESm = Ei∗ =
(i∗, i∗, . . . , i∗) and take a path p¯ ∈ Bi∗ such that ES1 , ES2 , . . . , ESm−1 are the
essential coalitions of the path p¯ between Ei∗−1 and Ei∗ . Then the p-vector
associated to the above path p¯ ∈ Bi∗ satisfies
xp¯(ESk) = aESk for k = 0, 1, . . . ,m. (12)
The previous system (12) gives
(xp¯)
θ(k)
i∗ = (x
p¯)
θ(k)
i∗−1 + aESk − aESk−1 for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
By construction of path p¯ we have that
(xp¯)ki = (x¯
i∗)ki = x
k
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ i∗ − 1 and all k ∈M. (13)
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Now,
r · xp¯ =
m∑
k=1
i∗−1∑
i=1
rki · (xp¯)ki +
m∑
k=1
r
θ(k)
i∗ · (xp¯)θ(k)i∗
=
m∑
k=1
i∗−1∑
i=1
rki · xki +
m∑
k=1
r
θ(k)
i∗ ·
(
(xp¯)
θ(k)
i∗−1 + aESk − aESk−1
)
=
m∑
k=1
i∗−1∑
i=1
rki · xki +
m∑
k=1
r
θ(k)
i∗ · (xp¯)θ(k)i∗−1
+
m−1∑
k=1
(
r
θ(k)
i∗ − rθ(k+1)i∗
)
· aESk − rθ(1)i∗ · aES0 + rθ(m)i∗ · aESm
≤
m∑
k=1
i∗−1∑
i=1
rki · xki +
m∑
k=1
r
θ(k)
i∗ · (xp¯)θ(k)i∗−1
+
m−1∑
k=1
(
r
θ(k)
i∗ − rθ(k+1)i∗
)
· x(ESk)− rθ(1)i∗ · x(ES0) + rθ(m)i∗ · x(ESm)
=
m∑
k=1
i∗−1∑
i=1
rki · xki +
m∑
k=1
r
θ(k)
i∗ · (xp¯)θ(k)i∗−1 +
m∑
k=1
r
θ(k)
i∗ ·
(
x(ESk)− x(ESk−1))
=
m∑
k=1
i∗−1∑
i=1
rki · xki +
m∑
k=1
r
θ(k)
i∗ · (xp¯)θ(k)i∗−1 +
m∑
k=1
r
θ(k)
i∗ · xθ(k)i∗ −
m∑
k=1
r
θ(k)
i∗ · xθ(k)i∗−1
= r · x¯i∗ +
m∑
k=1
r
θ(k)
i∗ ·
(
(xp¯)
θ(k)
i∗−1 − xθ(k)i∗−1
)
= r · x¯i∗ ,
where the inequality comes from x ∈ C(wA) and the fact that rθ(k)i∗ −
r
θ(k+1)
i∗ ≥ 0 for k = 1, . . . ,m− 1, and the last equality by (13).
We have reached a contradiction with (11). Consequently any extreme
core point is a p-vector.
Once we have established the main result of the paper, we move to some
related questions. We have just proved that paths from E0 to En char-
acterize the extreme core allocations of any square assortative multisided
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assignment market. We discuss now which is the maximum number of ex-
treme core allocations.
Take an arbitrary square assortative multisided game with m sectors and
n agents in each sector. We claim the maximum number of extreme core
allocations is
m · (m!)n−1. (14)
Indeed, as any path is composed of n subpaths, one for each subpart from
Ei−1 to Ei, for i = 1, . . . , n, we easily obtain that the total number of paths
from E0 to En is given by (m!)
n. Since we are interested in counting how
many extreme core allocations, we have to take into account that at the
beginning of any path, that is, from E0 to E1, only m different allocations
are possible. At this part m! paths collapse at most into m different vectors,
precisely those vectors where the worth aE1 is allocated to a particular agent
and give a zero payoff to the rest of agents, see Lemma 3.1. By all these
arguments, formula (14) is justified.
For the special case where7 array A satisfies
aE + aE′ = aE∨E′ + aE∧E′ for any essential coalitions E,E′, (15)
the formula (14) reduces to m if aE1 > 0 or to 1 if aE1 = 0.
As a numerical illustration, take the following 2 × 2 × 2 array A, with
Nk =
{
1k, 2k
}
for k = 1, 2, 3, which is a valuation array,
A =
 10 11
12 13
  14 15
16 17
 .
In it the rows correspond to agents in the first sector, columns to agents
in the second sector and matrices to agents in the third sector. Then, for
7These are supermodular and submodular arrays, and they are called valuation arrays.
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example, a(1,2,2) = 15. Its extreme core allocations are
x1 = (10, 12; 0, 1; 0, 4),
x2 = (0, 2; 10, 11; 0, 4),
x3 = (0, 2; 0, 1; 10, 14).
They can be computed by applying the p-vectors mechanism. Notice that
to apply this mechanism we have to check the monotonicity condition (2),
not implied by the fact that the array is a valuation.
Moreover any square valuation array A, monotonic or not, is fully-
optimal in the sense that all its matchings are optimal, i.e. M∗A
(
N1, . . . , Nm
)
=
M (N1, . . . , Nm) . Any pair of non-comparable essential coalitions E,E′ in
any matching can be changed by E∨E′ and E∧E′ without loosing efficiency.
The converse is not true,8 as the next example shows. The 2× 2× 2 array
A,
A =
 3 6
6 6
  6 6
6 9

is a fully-optimal multisided assignment matrix, but not a valuation, since
a(1,1,1) + a(2,1,2) = 3 + 6 = 9 < a(1,1,2) + a(2,1,1) = 12.
Moreover, it has an empty core, since being a fully-optimal matrix, any
core allocation must satisfy with equality all the array’ entries, but, as the
reader can check, they form a non-compatible linear system of equations.
Another important feature of a valuation array is that its entries can
always be arranged monotonically by a suitable permutation of the agents.
Therefore they can be seen as assortative markets. The way to see which
permutation is suitable is the following. Take any core element and from it
8For two-sided square assignment matrices, valuation and fully-optimal are equivalent.
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derive a permutation of agents in each sector such that arranges the compo-
nents in a non-decreasing way. Notice that this core element satisfies with
equality all entries in the array. In this way we obtain an assortative array,
that is, where the monotonicity property also holds. As a consequence we
can apply our results to any square valuation array. This fact simplifies the
assertions made in Sherstyuk (1999) since there is no need to distinguish
valuation markets from assortative ones.
It is easy to generate examples in which the maximum number of extreme
core points given in (14) is attained.
Consider the following 2× 2× 2 array A,
A =
 1 2
2 4
  3 7
5 10
 .
Notice that all inequalities of the supermodular property concerning non-
comparable essential coalitions are strict. There are 3 · (3!)1 = 18 different
extreme core allocations, that correspond to different paths.
x1 = (1, 2; 0, 2; 0, 6), x2 = (0, 1; 1, 3; 0, 6),
x3 = (0,1;0,2;1,7), x4 = (1, 2; 0, 5; 0, 3),
x5 = (0,1;1,6;0,3), x6 = (0, 1; 0, 5; 1, 4),
x7 = (1, 3; 0, 1; 0, 6), x8 = (0, 2; 1, 2; 0, 6),
x9 = (0,2;0,1;1,7), x10 = (1,4;0,1;0,5),
x11 = (0, 3; 1, 2; 0, 5), x12 = (0, 3; 0, 1; 1, 6),
x13 = (1, 3; 0, 5; 0, 2), x14 = (0,2;1,6;0,2),
x15 = (0, 2; 0, 5; 1, 3), x16 = (1,4;0,4;0,2),
x17 = (0, 3; 1, 5; 0, 2), x18 = (0, 3; 0, 4; 1, 3).
The six vectors in boldface correspond to the m! = 3! = 6 vectors given in
Sherstyuk (1999).
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